When multiple firms are simultaneously running experiments on a platform, the treatment effects for one firm may depend on the experimentation policies of others. This paper presents a set of causal estimands that are relevant to such an environment. We also present an experimental design that is suitable for facilitating experimentation across multiple competitors in such an environment. Together, these can be used by a platform to run experiments "as a service," on behalf of its participating firms. We show that the causal estimands we develop are identified nonparametrically by the variation induced by the design, and present two scalable estimators that help measure them in typical, high-dimensional situations. We implement the design on the advertising platform of JD.com, an eCommerce company, which is also a publisher of digital ads in China. We discuss how the design is engineered within the platform's auction-driven ad-allocation system, which is typical of modern, digital advertising marketplaces. Finally, we present results from a parallel experiment involving 16 advertisers and millions of JD.com users. These results showcase the importance of accommodating a role for interactions across experimenters and demonstrates the viability of the framework.
Introduction
Experimentation is a fixture of the digital age. It is routine for modern technology companies to run possibly hundreds or more of randomized controlled trials daily on their digital platforms to measure the effect of various interventions on user behavior and to formulate business strategy (Kohavi et al., 2009) . Several digital platforms now offer "experimentation as a service" to their participating clients, whereby the platform runs experiments on behalf of firms, acting as their agent to facilitate measurement. Examples in digital marketing include Adobe's Target A/B Tests (Adobe, 2019); Facebook's Brand Lift (Facebook, 2019) and Google's Website Optimizer (Google, 2019) . This paper pertains to the problem of facilitating parallel experimentation of this sort on a digital advertising platform.
Fundamentally, the effect of a firm's advertising depends on its competitor's actions. 1 At any point in time, the effectiveness of a firm's advertising may increase or decrease depending on which competitors advertise. For instance, viewing Amazon's ad may decrease the likelihood of consumers thinking of Walmart and shopping at Walmart.com. In such a situation, an ad that reminds the consumer of Walmart may become more effective when Amazon advertises. On the other hand, if Groupon's ad gives an unmatched discount, its presence may prevent Walmart's ad from being effective. Consequently, estimates from a firm's experiment measuring its ad effectiveness depends on which competitors advertised during the experiment. By extension of this rationale, these findings also depend on which competitors conducted their own ad effectiveness experiments simultaneously. This paper aims to provide a framework to account for these competitive factors while applying experimentation for evaluating advertising campaigns and for developing future advertising policies. In an empirical application on JD.com it demonstrates the importance of accounting for competitive actions in interpreting treatment effects.
The settings we are interested in relate to competitive marketplaces in which firms compete for capacity-constrained resources, such as high-traffic advertising spots on digital publishers. Our broad goal is to develop an experimental framework to assess the effectiveness of firms' actions on such competitive marketplaces. The innovation in the paper is to expand the state space to include the experimentation policies of competitors, so the treatment effects for a firm may also depend on the experimentation policies of others. This makes them relevant to a world with parallel experimentation by multiple firms.
The framework we develop consists of a set of causal estimands as well as an experimental design and estimation procedure that helps deliver these estimands.
Our causal estimands unpack the dependence of the average treatment effect of a focal firm's actions (henceforth, ATE) on the actions and experimentation strategies of others. In the case of digital advertising, these estimands reflect dependencies in the ATE of a firm's advertising with respect to the advertising policies of its competitors. To understand these dependencies, it is useful to think of the interactions between advertisers as occurring via two broad channels.
• First, there could be a direct channel by which the effect of a firm's advertising depends on its competitors ads. For example, a competitor's ad may introduce a competing product into the consumer's consideration set, changing the focal firm's advertising incentives (e.g., Goeree, 2008; Sahni, 2016) .
• Second, there is an indirect channel. By definition, the treatment effect is a contrast in user behavior relative to when the firm is not advertising. In a competitive marketplace, a competitor is likely to show her ad when the focal firm is not advertising. So, the relevant counterfactual to a firm's ad-exposure is a competing ad the user would have seen if the focal firm were not advertising. Since the counterfactual ad depends on the competitor, the ATE is also affected by competition.
Both the direct and indirect channels interact with the experimentation policy of competitors.
When a competitor is also experimenting in parallel, some users in the focal firm's experiment may get assigned to the competitor's control group. These users cannot see the competitor's ad for sure. If exposure to the competitor's ad (or its lack thereof) affects user behavior towards the focal firm via a direct channel, the fact that some users cannot see the competitor for sure affects the average user response for the focal firm, and thereby its ATE. This is one reason the ATE is affected by competitor experimentation. When competitors are experimenting in parallel, the indirect channel also affects the ATE in a distinct way, because the definition of the counterfactual now needs to be consistent with the fact that others are experimenting. Take the sub-set of users who are both in the focal firm's experiment and the control group of the competitor's experiment. For this sub-set, the relevant counterfactual for the focal firm's advertising that is consistent with the competitor's experimentation is an ad other than the focal ad and the experimenting competitor's ad. Since the identity of the counterfactual ad changes when the competitor is experimenting, the ATE also changes. This is another reason why the ATE is affected by competitor experimentation.
The advantage of the causal estimands we present is they represent these kinds of dependencies precisely.
How are these estimands useful? The estimands can be used normatively by the experimenting firms or the platform both retrospectively and prospectively. Retrospectively, given knowledge of the advertising and experimenting policies of the firms at the time of her experiment, the focal firm or the platform can use the estimands to understand the dependence of the measured ATE from the experiment on the actions of her competitors. This helps them interpret the effects obtained from the experiment, and how it depends on the advertising and experimentation policies of others.
Prospectively, given that the effects of its advertising depends on the advertising and experimentation policies of others, it is reasonable to contemplate to what extent the effects measured in the current experiment port to other states of the world. For instance it might be useful for an advertiser to understand how her treatment effects would look like when no one else is experimenting; or some subset of her competitors are experimenting; or when some subset of her competitors are just advertising (but not experimenting). The estimands can be used to develop a principled way of exploring how the advertiser's treatment effects vary in this way. We show that, given beliefs about the advertising and experimentation policies of others in such prospective future states of the world, the focal firm or the platform can use the estimands to fully trace out the corresponding prospective ATEs. In this sense, the prospective ATEs represent treatment effects for a variety of "what-if" scenarios that are helpful to campaign planning and decision making.
After outlining the causal estimands, we present an experimental design that is suitable for facilitating parallel experimentation by multiple competitors on a platform. The experimental design involves independent randomization across all users and across all experimenting firms. Conditional on randomization, the design requires that we deliver the relevant factual or counter-factual for each user-advertiser. To do this, the design requires that, for each user exposure opportunity in the experiment, users will see the "best" ad from the platform's perspective that is consistent with the user's joint treatment assignment simultaneously across all experimenting advertisers (the definition of "best" will depend on the platform's ad-allocation mechanism). Under this design, we provide a constructive proof that the causal estimands are identified nonparametrically. We then present two scalable estimators that help measure the estimands leveraging the identification strategy. The first is a linear regression estimator, which has the advantage of imposing minimal parametric structure and minimal pooling. Since this estimator does not scale well to situations where the number of competitors is large, we also present an alternative kernel-based estimator. This estimator leverages recently developed statistical methods for kernel smoothing over discrete sets (Li et al., 2013) to address the high-dimensionality of the parallel experimentation problem. The kernel-based estimator achieves scalability by utilizing some pooling, that is, by smoothing over different joint treatment assignments.
We implement the design on the advertising platform of JD.com, an eCommerce company, which is also a publisher of digital ads in China. Like most digital advertising marketplaces, JD's advertising marketplace is auction-driven. We show how we can take advantage of the ranking algorithm associated with JD's auction to engineer a scalable experimentation architecture that is compatible with automated ad-serving and that implements the features outlined above for the experimental design. We also discuss how we can log the counterfactual and remove users who have low probability of being exposed to an advertiser from the data so as to increase the statistical precision of our estimates.
Finally, we present results from a parallel experiment involving 16 advertisers, and approximately 22 million users on JD.com. To statistically test for the presence of competitive interactions, we use the linear regression estimator to detect the interaction between each of the 16 advertisers and their closest competitors. In our estimation, the presence or absence of ads from a firm's primary competitor changes the measured effectiveness of the ad by 32% to 122% when the ad's main effect is statistically significant. To assess how competitive actions affect advertising ATE we use our kernel-based estimator. This analysis shows that competitive interactions vary both qualitatively and quantitatively on the identity of the competitors and also on the total number of competing advertisers. Overall, these results show that interactions across advertisers in the data are statistically and economically meaningful and showcase the importance of accommodating a role for dependence across experimenters and demonstrates the viability of the framework.
The rest of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the relationship of this paper to the extant literature. The section afterward presents the model framework first in a simple example with two advertisers, and then in the general case. After that, we discuss the linear regression and kernel-based estimators, followed by implementation details. The following section discusses the results from the experiment implemented on the JD.com platform. The last section concludes.
Relationship to the Literature
This paper relates to several sub-literatures on experimentation and digital advertising. At a high level, note that our framework is meant to be implemented in a competitive marketplace in which actions and interactions are equilibrium outcomes. We develop methods to measure effects in this setting (addressing internal validity) and ways to port the measured effects to other settings (addressing external validity). In this respect, our paper is related to a body of work on experimentation in economics that has stressed the importance of measuring the equilibrium effects of interventions via randomized controlled trials, and to derive ways of assessing the external validity of effects measured from such trials (e.g., Acemoglu, 2010; Muralidharan and Niehaus, 2017) .
Our paper is also related to a large literature in the field of statistical experimental design on assessing interaction effects across multiple factors (e.g., Cox and Reid, 2000; Montgomery, 2013) .
Typically in this literature, interactions are measured by multivariate testing and full-factorial designs and the experimenter has fairly precise control over the assignment of users and the splits between treatment and control groups. Our experimental setting is more complex than the settings in this literature, as allocation to treatment is decentralized (determined by a marketplace mechanism), and effective sample size and splits of users are determined in equilibrium by the incentives and beliefs of market participants and by the platform's allocation mechanism. The experimental design literature has also suggested overlapping one-factor experiments as a way to implement multi-factor designs. Our proposed experimental design is similar to this broad suggestion, with specific differences arising mainly in terms of the details of its implementation in the context of a digital advertising market. Important advances have also been made in developing infrastructure for implementing overlapping experiments at scale (e.g., Tang et al., 2010) . Our work is complementary, and implementation of our design in practice would leverage such infrastructure. While the focus of that literature is primarily on developing a scalable architecture, our focus is on developing a set of treatment effects that incorporate experimentation, and on ways in which treatment effects learned in the experiment can be extrapolated to other situations. This paper is related to the copious literature on measuring digital advertising effects via randomized controlled trials (e.g., Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011; Lewis and Reiley, 2014; Blake et al., 2015; Sahni, 2015; Sahni and Nair, 2016; Gordon et al., forthcoming) , and to the empirical literature on measuring advertising effects in competition (e.g., Simester et al., 2017; Shapiro, 2018) , though these papers have not addressed the issue of parallel experimentation to our knowledge. Finally, to the extent that we leverage counterfactual policy logging to improve the precision of our estimates, our work is related to the recent literature on digital advertising that has suggested such strategies for improving statistical efficiency (e.g., Johnson et al., 2017; Simester et al., 2017) .
Motivation: A Simple Setup with 2 Advertisers
Consider an advertising platform selling a single advertising slot to two advertisers, j and k. Advertiser j wishes to estimate the effectiveness of displaying her ad on the platform. To do this, j runs a randomized control trial on the platform, henceforth referred to as an "experiment," so as to learn the average treatment effect (ATE) across users of the effect of her ad on a j−specific outcome variable, Y j . The experiment is facilitated by the platform on behalf of j and involves randomizing users into test and control groups. We want to understand how the ATE for j depends on k's advertising and experimentation policies on the platform. For simplicity, assume the two advertisers wish to target the same audience on the platform, and that whenever both are present the platform always displays j's ad. We introduce a more general set up in the next section.
k not advertising To set the baseline, consider the situation where k is not advertising on the platform while j is running her experiment. Denote this event by the indicator A (k) = 0. A simple experimental design ("A/B" test) that delivers the ATE is as follows: randomize test group users in the experiment into seeing j s ad, and randomize control groups users into seeing no ads, and contrast their mean behavior to obtain the ATE, τ j (A (k) = 0):
(1)
In (1), Y ij (j) is the potential outcome of user i for advertiser j when exposed to j s ad, and Y ij (0) is the potential outcome of user i for advertiser j when exposed to no ads. The control group's behavior represents the counterfactual for how equivalent users would behave if j were not advertising.
Since k is not advertising, the relevant counterfactual from j s perspective is "no ads."
Now consider a situation where k is also advertising on the platform while j is running her experiment, so that A (k) = 1. For simplicity, assume that k's willingness-to-pay for the advertising is high enough that if j is not advertising, k would surely occupy the ad-slot with its ad. There are now two states of the world. In one state of the world, k is also running an experiment in parallel while advertising, and in the other, k is not experimenting while advertising. Consider when k is advertising but not experimenting. The treatment effect in this situation, τ j (A (k) = 1, E (k) = 0), is conceptually distinct from τ j (A (k) = 0). First, "interaction effects" between j and k may arise if k's advertising on the platform affects users' behavior towards j via possible direct channels mentioned in the introduction. A second reason is that k's advertising changes the counterfactual for users in j s experiment: in the absence of j, the platform would show users ad k, so the relevant counterfactual for how equivalent users would behave if j were not advertising is how they behave when they see k. We can write the ATE for j as
The conditioning on A (k) = 1 in the first term on the RHS reflects the fact that the factual outcome for j may depend on the advertising of k. The contrast relative to Y ij (k) in the second term reflects the fact that k's advertising changes the identity of the counterfactual for the control group: it is k, and so the relevant contrast is the potential outcome for advertiser j when i is exposed to k's ads. The conditioning on A (k) = 1 in the second term reflects the fact that this counterfactual outcome may depend on the advertising of k over and above its effect via the user's exposure to k. Finally, notice that even though we left implicit the conditioning on A (j), it is an important object, for just like Y ij (j) depends on A (k) we expect Y ij (k) to depend on A (j).
k advertising and experimenting Consider when k is advertising and experimenting in parallel. There are now three effects. First, interaction effects continue to be possible given that k is advertising. A second effect arises because k's parallel experimentation causes some users to be assigned to k's control group in which they cannot see k's ad for sure. These users are also in j s experiment. If exposure to k's ad (or its lack thereof) affects users' behavior towards j, the fact that some users cannot see k for sure affects the average user response for j, and thereby its ATE. A third effect derives from the fact that k's experimentation changes the counterfactual for users in j s experiment. The implied change in the counterfactual works differently depending on whether a control user in j's experiment is in the test or control group of k's experiment:
• for users in the test group of k, the relevant counterfactual for how they would behave if j were not advertising is how they behave when they see k. This is because in the absence of j, the platform would show those users ad k, and since they are in the test group of k, exposure to k's ad is allowed and consistent with the fact that k is experimenting.
• for users in the control group of k, the relevant counterfactual for how they would behave if j were not advertising is how they behave when they see no ads. This is because in the absence of j, the platform could have shown those users ad k, but cannot, as they are in the control group of k, so they have to be shown "no ads" for consistency with the fact that k is experimenting.
To see how this affects the ATE, suppose that a proportion σ k of users are assigned to the test group in k's experiment. This means, 1. A proportion σ k of users in the test group of j's experiment are assigned to k's test group, and a proportion 1 − σ k of users are assigned to k's control group. The behavior of these subgroups may be different, due to its possible dependence on the advertising of k.
2.
A proportion σ k of users in the control group of j's experiment are assigned to k's treatment group, and a proportion 1 − σ k of users in the control group of j's experiment are assigned to k's control group. While the first subgroup may see k's ad as a counterfactual to j, the second subgroup sees no-ads as the counterfactual. Therefore, the behavior of these subgroups may differ. 2
Reflecting these, we can write the ATE as below, with the first term reflecting the outcome for j's test group, and the second term reflecting the outcome for j's control group,
Rearranging (3), we see the ATE for j in this situation is a convex combination of the expressions in (1) and (2) with weights determined by σ k :
Three AT Es
The above discussion shows how parallel experimentation by advertisers generates interactions across experiments. Equations (1), (2) and (3) represent three causal estimands for an advertiser j corresponding to three different ATEs. Conceptually, the three ATEs represent average treatment effects in different situations in which j can find itself while experimenting on the platform.
For the remainder of the paper, we denote by a binary variable, ω k , the state of the world in which the competitor k is not advertising (ω k = 0); or advertising but not experimenting (ω k = 1), i.e.,
Henceforth, we refer to ω k = 0 and ω k = 1 as degenerate states for advertiser k with corresponding degenerate ATEs, τ j (ω k ) . Given the degenerate ATEs, it is easy to see that we can recover the ATE for j when competitor k is advertising and experimenting as a function of σ k ,
Notice that expression (6) is equivalent to (4). Later, we will exploit this relationship linking the 2 Another way to see this dependence is to write the counterfactual outcome for exposure to j's ad as Y ij (j c ), where j c is the intervention users will be exposed to if j were counterfactually not advertising. The logic of the counterfactual induces a dependence on the advertising and experimentation policy of k because j c = j c (A (k)): if A (k) = 0, j c ≡ "no ads;" if A (k) = 1 and E (k) = 0, j c ≡ k; if A (k) = 1 and E (k) = 1, with probability σ k , j c ≡ k, and with probability 1 − σ k , j c ≡ "no ads." three ATEs to outline an experimental design suitable for a more general environment than presented in this example, and also to set up an estimator that uses the data from this design to deliver estimates of the ATEs.
Use of AT Es by the Platform and the Advertiser
The ATEs can be used by j both retrospectively and prospectively. Retrospectively, given knowledge of the state of the world in which it ran the experiment, j can map the measured ATE from the experiment to one of the three causal estimands above. This helps j interpret the effects it obtained from the experiment, and how they depend on the advertising and experimentation policies of others.
To use the ATEs prospectively, j would have to outline her beliefs about the probability of the 3 states of the world (k not advertising; k advertising but not experimenting; and k advertising and experimenting) obtaining. With these probabilities, indexed by p j ≡ p j (ω k ) , p * j (ω k ) , the ATE for j in a prospective future state of the world would be the weighted average of the corresponding ATEs,
The prospective ATE τ j p j , σ k can be traced out for any σ k ∈ [0, 1]. We can simplify (7) further by substituting for τ j (σ k ) from (6) to write it as a function of only the two degenerate ATEs,
Equation (8) has an intuitive interpretation. The term in square brackets in the first term, p j (0) +
, is the total probability that k will be not present to the average user in j's prospective future experiment. p j (0) is j's anticipated probability of k not advertising, and p * j (1) (1 − σ k ) is j's anticipated probability of k advertising and experimenting, but assigning a user to its control group. Similarly, p j (1) +p * j (1) σ k is the total probability that k will be present to the average user in j's prospective future experiment. p j (1) is j's anticipated probability of k advertising, and p * j (1) σ k is j's anticipated probability of k advertising and experimenting, and assigning a user to its test group. The overall ATE in equation (8) is the weighted average of the degenerate ATEs when k is present or not, with the weights being j s anticipated probabilities of k being present or not.
Reflecting this, we can write the prospective ATE using compact notation,
where we use p j,0 (σ k ) = p j (0) + p * j (1) (1 − σ k ) as shorthand for j s anticipated probability of k not being present as a competing advertiser; and p j,1 (σ k ) = p j (1) + p * j (1) σ k as shorthand for j s anticipated probability of k being present as a competing advertiser.
General Setup
The reality of an advertiser j's environment is more complicated than the simple example above, because she competes with more than one advertiser to display her ads. These competitors may target audiences that have varying degrees of commonality with j s target audience (unlike the previous example where the target audiences were fully common). Further, some subset of her competitors might or might not be advertising and/or experimenting at the same time as j is running her experiment. Finally, whether j's ad is served to a user is determined by the platform's ad-serving mechanism, which picks the ad to serve to a user based on its own (possibly proprietary) criteria.
To incorporate this, consider an environment with F firms. Out of the F, a set of N firms are advertising. The set of advertising firms is denoted N. An advertiser j has a fixed target audience for her product, which we denote TA j for j ∈ N. In addition, each advertiser allocates a fraction σ j of her target audience to her treatment group, T j , and the remaining to her control group, C j . Hence, if σ j = 1, j advertises but does not experiment, while if σ j = 0, j does not advertise at all. A user i in T j is eligible to see j's ad, and j competes (e.g., in an auction) to display her ad to i. Users in C j are not eligible to see j's ad. At each ad-exposure occasion to a user i, the platform uses a mechanism M to rank the set of eligible ads, N i ≡ j s.t. i ∈ TA j , j ∈ N . We denote the top ad in this list byM 1 (N i ).
What Can be Learned from the Experiment?
Our goal is to account for and assess the impact of parallel experimentation between advertisers in this environment on learning the ad effectiveness for a firm j both retrospectively and prospectively. Let N −j ≡ N \ j denote the set of advertising firms other than j. Observation 1 outlines the first restriction on what can be learned if firm j runs an experiment in this environment.
Observation 1. Learning interactions is possible only for k ∈ N −j .
Observation 1 says that firm j can trace out how its ATE depends on the prospective advertising and experimentation policies of its competitors only for the set of firms that are currently advertising, i.e., for k ∈ N −j . This is because we do not have a way of measuring τ j (ω k = 1), the degenerate ATE for j when k is advertising, for any k that is not advertising in the current environment. Therefore, following equation (9), the prospective ATE for such k also cannot be traced out.
Following observation 1, we focus the remainder of the discussion on the conditions required to trace out the prospective ATEs from j's perspective for firms k ∈ N −j . What can be learned depends on the way j's target audience intersects with those targeted by the other advertising firms.
To set up some notation to make this precise, divide TA j into non-overlapping partitions representing the intersection of TA j with the various combinations of other TA k -s, ∀k ∈ N −j . Collect the partitions in a set P j . Let q = 1, .., Q j index the elements of P j (so that Q j = P j ). We refer to the q th partition as P j (q). Let O jq be a set containing the identity of j's competitors in P j (q). 3 Figure 2 : Partitioning TA j when it Intersects with the Target Audiences of Two Other Advertisers, k and l Figure 2 illustrates the notation in an example with N = 3 advertisers indexed by j, k and l. For advertiser j, the set of competitors is N −j ≡ {k, l}. In Figure 2 , the target audience of j, TA j , is shown in the thick black box. TA j intersects with the target audiences of her competitors, TA k and TA l . There are 4 non-overlapping partitions of TA j in this example, so the set P j is of dimension Q j = 4. Partition q = 1 of TA j , P j (1), contains users who are targeted by j but not by k or l.
Partition q = 2, P j (2), contains users who are targeted by j and k, but not l. Partition q = 3, P j (3), contains users who are targeted by j and l, but not k. Finally, partition q = 4, P j (4), contains users who are targeted by j, k and l. The identity of j's competitors in P j (1)
Consider the following two assumptions about the way users in each partition are eligible (or not) to see ads. For partition P j (q), let T h|P j (q) denote the set of users in P j (q) who are eligible to see ads from an advertiser h, and C h|P j (q) as the set of users in P j (q) who are not eligible to see ads from an advertiser h. Assumption 1. Overlap and Full Support.
Assumption 1(i) states that all advertisers have some users who are eligible to see their ad and some users who are not in the audience partition P j (q) (i.e., the equalities, σ h|P j (q) = 0 or σ h|P j (q) = 1 are ruled out for all h ∈ {j ∪ O jq }). Assumption 1(ii) implies that there are users in P j (q) belonging to every possible eligible-not-eligible combination across all the advertisers in that partition.
This condition is likely to be satisfied with a sufficiently large number of users and independent experimentation across advertisers. Assumption 1(iii) handles a boundary case of Assumption 1(ii), ensuring that the set of users who are eligible to see ads across all the advertisers in that partition, or not eligible to see ads across all the advertisers in that partition, is not a null set.
Observation 2 follows from these assumptions.
Observation 2. In each partition, P j (q), it is possible to learn from the data, the interactions for j with respect to competitors that satisfy overlap and have full support with j in P j (q).
To see the intuition for observation 2, note that to learn the effect of h's ads within P j (q), we need to be able to see some users within P j (q) who are eligible to see h's ads and some who are not. This is possible for all h that satisfy assumption 1(i). Secondly, in order to learn the degenerate ATEs of j with respect to a competitor in O jq , we need to see, within P j (q), some users who are eligible to see j and that competitor; and some users who are eligible to see j but not eligible to see that competitor. This is possible for all competitors that satisfy assumptions 1(ii) and 1(iii). Consequently, within each partition P j (q), we will be able to learn from the data the degenerate ATEs − and thereby, the prospective ATEs − for (only) those advertisers whose current advertising strategy in the current environment satisfy overlap and full support within P j (q).
To see this in an example, suppose the experimental environment is the one in Figure 2 . Assume assumption 1 holds inside each of the four partitions, P j (1) , .., P j (4). Then,
• In partition P j (1), we can recover from the data the ATE for j in a state of the world where k and l are not advertising, i.e., τ j ω k = 0, ω l = 0|P j (1) . Because j's advertising satisfies assumption 1, there are some users who are eligible to see j and some who are not within this partition, which facilitates learning this ATE. The ATE for j when k or l are advertising is the same as when they are not in this partition. This is because the users in P j (1) are not part of the audiences that k or l wish to target when they advertise, so interference with k or l is not
• In partition P j (2), we can recover from the data the ATEs for j in states of the world where k is advertising but l is not i.e., τ j ω k , ω l = 0|P j (2) . Because users in P j (2) are in both j and k's target audiences, and j and k's advertising satisfies assumption 1, there are some users who are eligible to see j, k and some who are not within this partition, which facilitates learning these ATEs. Since l is not interested in targeting users in P j (2), the ATE for j when l is advertising is the same as when she is not, so
The case for P j (3) is analogous (i.e., τ j ω k = 0, ω l |P j (3) can be learned from the data, and
• In partition P j (4), we can recover all the ATEs for j from the data. Since these users are in j, k's and l's target audiences, and j, k s and l's advertising satisfy assumption 1, there are some users who are eligible to see j, k, l and some who are not within this partition, so all the ATEs, τ j ω k , ω l |P j (4) , can be learned.
With this intuition established, we now outline an experimental design that accounts for parallel experimentation, and discuss how the data from this design identifies the ATEs subject to the above restrictions.
Experimental Design and Identification
The experimental design involves N advertisers. Let j's test group be denoted T j and her control group denoted C j . For a user i in the experiment, define his total treatment assignment as the N−dimensional vector
where the indicator D ij is defined as
Thus, D ij = 1 whenever a user i is in TA j and assigned to j's test group; and D ij = 0, whenever a user i is in TA j and assigned to j s control group or not in TA j .
Also define user i's target audience partition as the ∑ N j=1 Q j −dimensional vector,
where the Q j × 1 vector S ij = (S ij1 , .., S ijq , .., S ijQ j ) has indicator element S ijq defined as
Thus, S ijq = 1 whenever i is in TA j and belongs to the q th partition for advertiser j, and S ijq = 0 otherwise.
Consider a design that maintains the following three features.
Definition 1. Parallel Experimentation Design 1. Independent Randomization: Users in each advertiser's target audience TA j are independently randomized to T j or C j .
2. Ad-exposure restriction: During the experiment, a user i with total treatment assignment vector D i is eligible to see all j for which D ij = 1, and ineligible to see all j for which D ij = 0.
3. Ad-exposure allocation: At every ad-exposure opportunity for a user in the experiment, the platform serves ad M 1 N \ {j s.t. D ij = 0} , i.e. the top ranked eligible ad that satisfies restriction 2.
Consider a partition P j (q). It is easy to see that independent randomization across all users trivially ensures that overlap (assumption 1(i)) is satisfied within P j (q). Further, if there are a large number of users, independent randomization also ensures full support is satisfied within P j (q) (assumptions 1(ii) and 1(iii)). Both are testable prior to the start of the experiment.
The ad-exposure restriction ensures that the exposure of users to ads in the experiment is consistent with parallel experimentation: the test group users of an advertiser are eligible to see j, but the control group users of j are not eligible to see j, for all j ∈ N.
Finally, the ad-exposure allocation ensures that the exposure of users to ads in the experiment is consistent with competition on the platform, and delivers the relevant counterfactual for measuring the ATEs. For each j, users in the test group of j will be served j's ad whenever it is the "best" from the platform's perspective. If j is not the best, the user will be served whichever other ad is best from the platform's perspective at that ad-exposure opportunity such that this exposure is consistent with the user's ad-exposure restriction. Similarly, for each j, users in the control group of j will be served whichever non-j ad the platform assess as best at that ad-exposure opportunity such that this exposure is consistent with the user's ad-exposure restriction. 4
Theorem 1 below shows that, for each partition P j (q), the degenerate ATEs of j are identified from data generated by a parallel experiment that satisfies features 1−3 in definition 1.
Theorem 1. Under the Parallel Experimentation Design in definition 1, the degenerate ATEs of j within a partition, τ j (ω −j |P j (q)), are identified by the data.
Proof To prove Theorem 1 we use the randomization between test and control groups for advertisers to emulate degenerate states of the world.
Intuition for Proof with Two Advertisers
Reconsider the simple example from §3 with only two advertisers, j and k, so that there are two degenerate ATEs for j, τ j (1) and τ j (0), corresponding
to ω k = 1 and ω k = 0, respectively. Now allow j and k to have different target audiences, TA j and TA k , that have some non-empty intersection. We can divide advertiser j s target audience TA j into two partitions, P j (1) corresponding to TA j ∩ TA k = ∅, and P j (2) corresponding to TA j ∩ TA k = ∅. Consider users that are part of TA j . The target audience partition vector for one such user, i, with respect to advertiser j, S ij , is two-dimensional, corresponding to q = 1, 2. Users with S ij = (1, 0) are in partition P j (1), and users with S ij = (0, 1) are in partition P j (2). The total treatment assignment vector for the users, D i , is also 2-dimensional. For example, if D i = (1, 0), i is in j's test group and in k's control group, and if D i = (0, 1), i is in j's control group and in 4 The definition of "best" depends on the goals of the platform and its advertising allocation mechanism, M. Most digital ads (including our empirical application in this paper to JD.com's marketplace) are sold via an auction. For each ad-exposure opportunity, the system retrieves a set of advertisers who are interested in showing their ads to that user and stores it in a queue. The advertisers in the queue are ranked according to a quality-weighted score that is a function of their bids and a proprietary scoring algorithm, such that the ad that is "best" from the platform's perspective has the highest rank; the ad that is next best from the platform's perspective has the second highest rank; and so on. In the absence of experimentation, the top ranked advertiser in this queue is displayed. Such a ranking makes it easy to implement feature 3 in the above experimental design: one removes from the queue all advertisers j for the user for who D ij = 1, and shows the top-ranked one from the remaining queue (including "no ads" if no ads are remaining). k's test group. Assumption 1 implies that we observe all values of D i in the data. Therefore, we can compare users assigned to different D i 's within each partition to identify the ATEs within that partition.
Partition P j (2) First, consider users in partition P j (2). The relevant competitor to j within P j (2) is O j2 ≡ {k}. So, the theorem implies that, within this partition, we are able to identify the degenerate ATEs for j with respect to k.
To see this, take only users who are in the test group of k. By calculating the average difference between j's outcomes across her test and control groups in this partition, we are able to identify the ATE for j in a world where k advertises but does not experiment,
Analogously, by looking only at users who are in k's control group, we are able to identify j's ATE in a world where k does not advertise. That is, Figure 3 presents the intuition graphically.
Partition P j (1) Now, consider users in partition P j (1). The relevant competitor to j within
So, the theorem implies that, within this partition, we are able to identify from the data the degenerate ATE for j when no one else is advertising.
To see this, note that by contrasting the behavior of users who are eligible or not to see j within this partition, we can identify j's ATE in a world where k does not advertise. That is,
Because k is not interested in targeting users in P j (1), the ATE for j when k is advertising is the same as when k is not. Therefore, τ j (1|P j (1)) = τ j (0|P j (1)).
General Case With a generic partition, P j (q), the same logic applies. Define the state of the world as the (N − 1)−dimensional vector that indicates which of the N − 1 competitors of j are advertising and denote it by ω −j . The set of all 2 N−1 possible states of the world is denoted Ω j . Let τ j (ω −j |P j (q)) denote the degenerate ATEs of j within partition P j (q), i.e., when some subset of her N − 1 competitors (as indexed by ω −j ) are either not advertising or advertising but not experimenting.
Analogously to (12) and (13) above, we can recover τ j (ω −j |P j (q)) by calculating the average difference between j's outcomes across her test and control groups for a specific subgroup within that partition. This subgroup consists of users who are in the control groups of j s competitors within the partition; and users who are in the test groups of j's competitors within the partition. That is, letting d denote a possible realization of the advertising status of j's competitors, and s the value of the S ij vector that corresponds to P j (q), we can identify,
In equation (15), D ij is the j th entry in D i . The two terms contrast a subset of users with D ij = 1 to those with D ij = 0. D i,−j is an (N − 1)−dimensional vector equal to D i but excluding the coordinate for j. The conditioning D i,−j = d implies we include users who are in the test groups of all competitors in the state of the world d, and in the control groups of all competitors in the state of the world d. Finally, the vector S ij picks out the partition of j that a user i belongs to.
The conditioning S ij = s picks out only users who belong to partition P j (q). The ATE is a contrast between those who are eligible or not to see j's ad for the subset of users in that partition. This holds for all d. 5 Hence, all the degenerate ATEs for j in the partition with respect to all its competitors are identified. ♠ Corollary 1 follows from Theorem 1.
Corollary 1.
Under the Parallel Experimentation Design in definition 1, the prospective ATEs of j with respect to its competitors within a partition, τ j p j , σ −j |P j (q) , are identified.
Proof Recall from equation (9) that the prospective ATEs for advertiser j are the weighted average of the degenerate ATEs, where the weights are the anticipated probabilities from j's perspective of the other competitors being present or not. All the degenerate ATEs of j within each partition with respect to its competitors are identified per above. It follows that given beliefs about the advertising and experimentation policies of competitors with respect to that partition, the prospective ATEs can also be recovered. The general version of expression (9) is given by,
where p j,ω −j (σ −j |P j (q)) denotes j's beliefs that state ω −j occurs within partition P j (q) as a function of p j and σ −j . 6 Note that in tracing out the prospective ATEs this way, we hold "all other things" equal (including the target audiences of advertisers and other factors like the content of ads). Since equation (16) holds for each P j (q), all the prospective ATEs can also be recovered. ♠
Summary
The above discussion showed the conditions required for learning interactions across advertisers, and presented a design for running an experiment in parallel across those advertisers. The experimental design generates data that identifies a set of ATEs that encapsulate the interactions both retrospectively and prospectively.
When will we infer significant competitive interference? Firstly, j will experience no interference advertising status of the competitors not targeting users in partition P j (q), is the same as when those competitors are not advertising. To be precise, split d into two subsets, (1) a Q j × 1 vector d q , denoting a possible realization of the advertising status of the Q j competitors relevant to j in that partition; and (2), a (N − Q j − 1)×1 vector d q , denoting a possible realization of the advertising status of the (N − Q j − 1) competitors not relevant to j in that partition; so that d ≡ d q , d q . Since D ik = 0, ∀k / ∈ O jq , ∀i ∈ TA j by definition, equation (15) measures τ j (d q , d q = 0, s). The ATE in that partition for any other d q is the same, i.e., τ j (d q , d q , s) = τ j (d q , d q = 0, s). 6 To see how we construct p j,ω −j (σ −j |P j (q)), consider a case where j faces two competitors, k and . Now, equation
(16) contains four p j,ω −j (σ −j |P j (q)) terms and four τ j (ω −j |P j (q)) terms. Assume that j believes that k's decisions are completely independent from 's. Then, we can express p j,ω −j (σ −j |P j (q)) = p j,ω k (σ k |P j (q)) × p j,ω (σ |P j (q)). Following the logic in §3.1.1, it is easy to see that p j,ω k (σ k |P j (q)) = p jk (ω k |P j (q))
With more competitors and non-independent decisions, these expressions become cumbersome and are omitted. from a competitor k's advertising when TA j ∩ TA k = ∅. Therefore, for interference to be substantial, the proportion of TA j that overlaps with TA k will have to be non-trivial. Secondly, the direct and indirect effects (discussed in §3) will have to be significant for competition to matter. We now present two estimators for analyzing data generated by the parallel experimentation design and discuss their properties.
Two Estimators
The first is a linear regression estimator, and the second is a semi-parametric kernel-based estimator. Both estimators target learning the ATEs at all degenerate states of the world for a given advertiser, j. The linear regression estimator imposes minimal parametric structure and does minimal pooling, but does not scale to situations in which the number of competitors is large. The kernel-based estimator is able to handle high-dimensional situations, but utilizes some pooling by smoothing over different treatment assignments.
Linear Regression Estimator
Consider the total treatment assignment D i,−j = d and target audience partition S ij = s. We can recover the ATE associated with this scenario by running the regression,
using only users such that D i,−j = d and S ij = s. Alternatively we can stack up observations and recover all identified ATEs by running the regression,
In our simple example with 2 advertisers in §4.2 above, D i,−j = {(0), (1)}, which encompasses all possible combinations of test/control for the remaining advertisers, in this case just k. In addition, S ij = {(1, 0) , (0, 1)}, indicating whether i is in the part of TA j that intersects with TA k or not. Each estimate of β ds is a consistent estimator for τ
Kernel-Based Estimator
It is clear from equation (18) that the potential number of ATEs to be estimated increases exponentially with the number of competitors j can face. Consequently, with a large number of competitors, the regression approach based on indicators might not be desirable. Instead, we can consider utilizing smoothing techniques designed to handle categorical variables. In particular, we can use the tools developed by Li et al. (2013) . Before proceeding, the following technicality must be noted:
while we consider a scenario in which N is large, we treat it as fixed. In other words, for the asymptotics below to be valid, we do not allow the number of advertisers to increase as a function of the sample size.
Notice first that we can rewrite equation (18) as,
where
cates that the parameters vary depending on what the treatment assignment and target audience partition are. That is, the ATEs are allowed to vary across the different treatment assignments and partitions.
Since the elements of vector Z ij are categorical, we cannot use a traditional kernel function designed for continuous variables. Instead, we will use the following kernel meant for smoothing over discrete variables. For the v-th coordinate of Z ij , let,
where z v is a value that the v-th coordinate of Z ij can take. In our case, therefore, z v ∈ {0, 1} for all v's. The overall kernel is given by the product kernel function,
where the vectors z and λ simply collect all z v 's and λ v 's, respectively.
Our estimator at the treatment assignment d and target audience partition s is then given by:
Notice that when λ = 0 the kernel function becomes an indicator and we obtain the OLS estimator applied to equation (17). As is usually the case with smoothing techniques, it is crucial to appropriately pick the tuning parameter, λ, which is analogous to the bandwidth in traditional kernel estimators. We can choose λ by minimizing the following cross-validation criterion function,
Under mild technical conditions (see (Li et al., 2013) ), it follows thatλ = O P (I −1 ) and,
The above estimator can be implemented in three steps. In step 1, we pick all users i = 1, ..., I in j's experiment (across all partitions); in step 2, we use equation (23) to compute the bandwidths;
in step 3, we use the computed bandwidths from step 2 in equation (22) to recover the ATEs for j at every treatment assignment d and target audience partition s.
Implementation for Front-Focused APP ads at JD.com
We implemented the experimental design outlined in §4.2 on JD.com's Conversion Lift System (JD.com, 2019). Conversion Lift is an on-demand product we designed that allows advertisers to run experiments to assess the performance of their campaigns on JD's ad-inventory. Implementation of the system at scale requires consideration of additional details pertaining to accommodating the auction-driven allocation system for serving ads; reducing latency in ad-serving while experimenting; and improving statistical precision in the analysis of the data from the experiment. We describe these next. For what follows, when we say "ad position" we refer to a specific slot on the publisher's digital real-estate at which ads can be shown. Each campaign specifies a target audience; a set of ad-positions at which users of that target audience are to be shown ads; a creative or set of creatives (i.e., images) associated with the campaign which are shown when the ad is served; and a set of rules specifying how much the advertiser would like to bid for users as part of the campaign. When a user arrives at an ad-position on JD, the system retrieves in real-time a queue containing the list of advertisers that are eligible to show ads to that user. The list is then sorted on the basis of a proprietary ad quality score that comprises several variables, including bids. The use of a quality score rather than purely bids reflects the desire of the publisher to ensure an experience that reduces user annoyance and generates long-term value to all players in the ecosystem (users, advertisers and publishers). Programmatic ads on most digital ad platforms are sold this way (e.g., Narayanan and Kalyanam, 2015) . seconds. The user can also manually rotate the ads by swiping on it. Once the user clicks on an ad, the app directs him to a "landing page", which shows more information including large images of the featured products, promotional coupons, and a collection of relevant products. Figure 4b shows an example. If a user clicks on a product on the landing page, he arrives at a product detail page featuring detailed information about the product including prices, coupons, reviews, etc. He can then add the product to his shopping cart and finish the purchase.
Auction-Driven Ads Marketplace

Front-Focused Mobile Ads
Ad-Serving Mechanism
The front-focus ad positions are valued by advertisers because of their prominence and their large number of exposures, and are considered premium ad inventory.
Front-focus ad auctions feature some specific characteristics which are relevant for engineering the experimental design, so we discuss these here.
First, when setting up campaigns for such inventory, advertisers are required to specify a base level bid which applies to all users, and then select possible specific targeting audiences to which premium bids may apply. This implies that no user is explicitly excluded from the target audience of advertisers for these positions; all exclusions and inclusions are induced via the bids the advertiser specifies. 7 Advertisers also cannot specify a particular front-focus ad position to bid for, and can only specify they wish to show an ad at any one of the available front-focus positions.
When a user arrives at the homepage, advertisers interested in targeting him participate in an RTB auction to compete to show an ad for available front-focus ad positions. Some positions may not be available to show an ad or may show pre-determined ads because of contractual arrangements.
During ad-serving, auction queues are generated independently for each ad position. Each queue can be the same or may be slightly different because of technical specifications. The queue rank is based on the quality score mentioned above. A user-experience control system further filters the ranked queues to ensure consistency with user experience. The user experience control system tries to avoid repeating ads from the same advertiser across the various front-focus positions at a given impression opportunity. Certain ad types may disobey this rule, and the complete rules depend on ad types and contractual arrangements. Additional use experience control, such as pacing, also feed into the ad serving rules. Once the queue clears the user experience control system's filters, the top-ranked ad at the corresponding ad position is served.
There is a distinction between an ad-served and an ad-seen. Serving refers to the process by which a set of ads are sent from the ad-server to the client (in this example, the user's app). To reduce latency, the ads for all 8 positions are served by the ad-server to the client in one shot. A user may choose to look away, or navigate away from the front-focus of the app before seeing the ad served at one of the ad-positions. The "compliance" with the ad served is therefore a decision by the user (this affects the interpretation of the ATE; discussed below). Generally speaking, ad positions with lower index (on the left) have higher chances of being seen by the user because the ads rotate from left to right. Overall, this system represent the mechanism M referred to in definition 1 of §4.2, which determines ad-serving on the platform.
One implication of the complexity of the mechanism is that the relevant counterfactual to an ad is not trivial to obtain: if an advertiser decides not to show her ad to the user, the next ad in the ranked queue would be served to the user, subject to the user experience control system's filter. Since only the platform can retrieve this in real-time, only the platform can reliably run this experiment. This is a motivation for developing a product that delivers "experiments as a service". The challenge is to engineer the experimental design in the context of this system.
Engineering the Experiment
Engineering the experiment requires figuring out a strategy for randomization, a way to adapt ad-serving to deliver the right factual and counterfactual ads for users in the experiment, and a way to log data so as to facilitate statistical analysis that delivers high enough precision.
ing. See, https://support.google.com/google-ads/answer/7365594?hl=en, Accessed: March 21, 2019.
Randomization At the beginning of the experiment, the engineered system first retrieves all experimental advertisers N, and assign a campaign index to each advertiser j ∈ N. 8 We then use the hash MD5 quasi-randomization method (Rivest, 1992) to assign each user i ∈ TA j and all j ∈ N a common randomization seed,
where D ij is user i's treatment assignment for advertiser j. This approach effectively stores a consistent randomization method instead of storing the total assignment vector D i for each user i and is helpful for reducing latency in the online system. Otherwise, we would have to store tens of billions of treatment assignments and impose a heavy cost in the online ad serving system. The hash method only takes take user id, campaign index and a seed as independent, and therefore, users in each advertiser's target audiences TA j are independently randomized to T j or C j .
Ad-Serving
At ad-serving time, the queue for each impression opportunity is generated as described above, and passed through the auction and user experience control system. To induce the experiment into the system, we first remove all j s.t. D ij = 0 from the ranked auction queue. This ensures the user is eligible to see j if D ij = 1 and ineligible to see j otherwise. The remaining ads in the ranked queue are passed through the user experience control system again and the top ad is served to the user. This way, we allocate the ad position to the top eligible ad, which is economically efficient for the platform, while ensuring the user experience is not degraded while the experiment is ongoing. Figure 5 shows an example to illustrate the system. We focus on one front-focus ad position and a situation with three advertisers, 1, 2, 3. Advertiser 1 and 2 are conducting a parallel experiment, and advertiser 3 is not. A user i is independently assigned to the treatment and control groups of 1 and 2, which determines his treatment assignment vector, D i . In an auction for the user, the possible ads are Ad 1, Ad 2 and Ad 3. Figure 5 illustrates which ad would be served to the user in the auction for various possible realizations of D i . For instance, looking at the first columns where the auction queue is (Ad 1, Ad 2, Ad 3) , we see that the user would be served Ad 1 if he were in the test groups of advertisers 1 and 2; or in the test group of advertiser 1 and in the control group of 2. This is because Ad 1 is at the top of the queue (ad allocation restriction) and serving him that is consistent with his ad exposure restriction. If the user is in the control group of 1 and in the test group of 2, he would be served Ad 2, as Ad 2 is the auction-specific counterfactual ad, and
showing him that is consistent with his ad-exposure restriction. Finally, if the user is in the control groups of advertisers 1 and 2, he is served Ad 3, because showing it is the top ranked ad that is consistent with his ad-exposure restriction.
Multiple Ad-Exposures An experiment can last for multiple days, and pertains to multiple frontfocus ad positions. During the course of the experiment, users may visit the front focus of the JD app multiple times. Hence, the engineered system needs to handle users participation in multiple auctions. What is critical for the design is that assignment of a user to treatment or control is persistent across these auctions. The system scales naturally to multiple auctions because the randomization method ensures the user is always either in the treatment or control group consistently during the entire experimental period (i.e., the hash is at the user-campaign level, not at the user-campaign-auction level). Figure 6 shows how this works in the engineered system. The user i participates in T i auctions during the duration of the experiment; and in each auction, he is eligible or not to see ads based on his assignment status according to the system explained above. The outcome variable for the user, Y ij , is his cumulative behavior over the duration of the experiment.
Counterfactual Policy Logging
The effects of digital ads may be small, and may require in practice data on hundreds of thousands of users to achieve statistical precision. To improve precision, as part of the engineered system, we log the auction queue before control ads are dropped, which represents the counterfactual ad queue if none of the experimenting firms were experimenting. In this counterfactual scenario, the ad on the top of the logged queue would be served to the user, so we call this the "auction-specific counterfactual ad." For each auction, we also log which ad is served to the user. We call this the "auction-specific factual ad." In statistical analysis, we constrain our analysis to users who factually or counterfactually are served the focal experimental ad in at least one auction. This ensures we implement statistical analysis on a set of users in the treatment group who have the highest opportunity to be factually served the focal ad, and on a set of equivalent users in the control group who have the highest opportunity to be counterfactually served the focal ad. By removing users with low propensity to be served the focal ad from the analysis, we improve precision (e.g., Johnson et al., 2017; Simester et al., 2017) .
Interpretation of Treatment Effects
The ATEs we measure capture the effect of being assigned to a treated group rather than the control group. Assignment to treatment implies a user is eligible to be served ads from the focal advertiser; assignment to control implies the user is not eligible.
Eligibility implies the user may be served the focal advertiser's ads during one or more auctions during the course of the experiment, not that the user actually sees all those ads. This is due to the fact that the exposure to the focal advertiser's ads depends on the auctions the user participates in during the experiment, and because of the user's decision to comply with seeing the ads served to him at each such auction. Leveraging the logging, we can include in our statistical analysis only So, the effects we measure should be interpreted as the treatment effect of being served the focal advertiser's ads, or as the intent-to-treat effect of seeing the focal advertiser's ads, for the subpopulation of users the publisher would serve the advertiser's ads to on its platform.
Data and Results
Our data are from a parallel experiment involving 27 advertising campaigns that ran for a 3-day period in September 2018. 70% of the users are assigned to the each advertiser's treatment group and 30% into the corresponding control group. Out of the 27 campaigns, 16 campaigns have more than 200,000 experimental users. Campaigns with less than 200,000 users are dropped from the analysis. We track total user visits to the product detail pages of the products listed on the landing page of each ad. Note, users can arrive at the product detail page through searches, other ads, and organic recommendations as well. Advertisers value visitation to the product detail page (because it forms an antecedent to actual conversion), and one explicit role of front-focus ads is to drive such visitation. Therefore, this is an important metric to analyze and forms our dependent variable in the analysis reported below.
Overlap Across Campaigns in Sample
The sample comprises approximately 22 million users who are exposed to at least one of the 16 experimental ad campaigns. We say an individual is "exposed" to a campaign if he or she would have been served the ad if there was no experimentation. 9
Given the nature of front-focused ads discussed in §6, we can abstract from issues regarding target audience partitioning in this analysis. This is because all users are in the target audiences of all 16 advertisers in our application. Using our previous notation, there is a unique P j (q) in which all −j competitors are present for every j, and the treatment assignments consist of treatment/control combinations across the 16 campaigns. About 27% of users in our sample are exposed to more than one of the 16 campaigns. Table 1 shows the distribution of exposure across users.
How much of a campaign's target population is exposed to other campaigns? This would determine the potential for interference from other campaigns. Table 2 shows that 50% of users in the median campaign are exposed to at least one other campaign. Column (2) shows that substantial overlap can occur with a single competing campaign. (1) % of targeted users exposed to at least one other campaign
(2) % of targeted users exposed to another campaign with the largest overlap 
Randomization Checks
Due to experimentation, 70% of users exposed to any campaign are assigned to the treatment group, and 30% to the control group. In this section, we perform several checks to verify that randomization balanced the samples on observable characteristics.
For each of the 16 campaigns we test whether 70% of users are assigned to the treatment group using an F-test. Some of the 16 tests may reject the null hypotheses by chance, as a false positive.
Therefore, to make a joint assessment, we focus on the distribution of the 16 p-values. If the null hypothesis holds (i.e., users are assigned 70-30 to treatment and control), these p-values would be random draws from a uniform distribution. Following this rationale, we create a quantile plot of the 16 p-values, shown in Figure 7a . A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is unable to reject that these p-values are randomly generated from a uniform distribution (p-value = .99).
For each individual in our sample, we obtained data on measures of pre-experimental behavior -the number of page-visit, cart creation, order, sales occurrences for each in the three days prior to our experimental campaigns. We check whether these measures are balanced across treatment and control groups for each campaign. Specifically, separately for each of the 16 campaigns we jointly test whether the means for each of the four measures are equal for the treatment and control groups. Hence, we get one p-value for each campaign. Figure 7b shows a quantile plot of these pvalues. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is unable to reject that these p-values are randomly generated by a uniform distribution (p-value = .79). 10
Existence of Cross-experimental Interference and Linear Regression Estimates
We first examine whether there exists interference between a campaign and its closest competitor.
In this sense, this analysis parallels the 2 firm example in section 3. We evaluate both the statistical and economic significance of such competitive interference.
Analysis Dataset
For each advertiser j, we identify the closest competitor k for this analysis. We define the closest competitor as the advertiser k that directly competes with j most often; that is, the one that bids in the same auctions as j the most in our data.
For statistical efficiency of our estimates, and to draw a parallel with section 3, we include in our analysis users that are exposed either factually or counterfactually to both the advertiser j and 10 Using a similar test we are able to verify that treatment assignment to the focal campaign, and the rival's campaign are uncorrelated (p-value = .43). 
Existence of Competitive Interaction Effects
For each campaign j, we estimate the following regression model,
where D ij is an indicator of whether the individual i is assigned to the treatment group for campaign j; D ik is an indicator of whether i got assigned to the treatment group for j's primary rival campaign. The error term ij is allowed to be heteroskedastic.
(a) For statistical testing, we use the same approach as in section 7.1.1. If there is no impact of the main rival's advertising status on the focal campaign's effectiveness, we should find the interaction effect in the regression to be zero. In that case, a test for statistical significance of β 3 would yield a p-value drawn randomly from a uniform distribution. To check if this occurs in the data, we first look at a quantile plot of the p-values shown in Figure 8a . This plot shows that almost all quantiles are below the 45 degree line (unlike the randomization checks in Figure 7b ). It shows that the p-values tend to be smaller than what they would be if they were randomly drawn; e.g., 50% of the p-values are less than 0.2. We test whether the distribution of the 16 p-values is the same as a uniform distribution. We can reject that p-values are randomly drawn from such a distribution (p-value = .064).
(b) We expect interference to exist when the main effect is significant. (If the ad is not appealing, the presence of the other campaign should not matter). Once we condition on the main effect being significant (p-value of the main effect ≤ .1), which occurs for six campaigns, the interference effect becomes more significant. The quantile plot is shown in Figure 8b ; we can reject that the p-values are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution (p-value < .01).
Economic Significance of Competitive Interaction Effects
Comparing point estimates of the effect of advertising (i.e., comparing β 1 and β 3 in equation (25)) tells us that the impact of competitive presence can be quite large in magnitude. The estimate of the interaction effect (β 3 ) ranges from 32% to 122% of the main effect (β 1 ) for campaigns in which the main effect is statistically significant.
A sophisticated advertiser would take into account the whole sampling distribution to make decisions. Figure 9 shows that the sampling distribution of estimated advertising effect is quite differ- Overall This analysis shows the existence of significant competitive interference between closest competitors with overlapping target audiences.
Results from Kernel-Based Estimation
This section presents results from the kernel-based estimation procedure described in §5.2. In addition to assessing the existence of interference amongst competing advertisers, we use the estimator to assess heterogeneity in interference across competitors qualitatively and quantitatively.
For the purposes of this exercise, we focus solely on advertiser 3 to display the results, because the cross-validation procedure is highly computationally intensive. Hence, we chose a campaign with a relatively modest number of observations in the sample that would also provide credible estimates. Since advertiser 3 faced 15 competitors, the goal is to recover 2 15 = 32, 678 different ATEs.
Given that there are 361,672 observations for campaign 3, we postulated that the implied average of a little more than 10 observations per treatment assignment is sufficient to obtain credible estimates of the ATEs.
The estimator requires bandwidths to be computed. For this, we use the leave-one-out crossvalidation procedure given in §5.2. To alleviate the computational burden associated with this method, we first split our sample into a training sample, which corresponds to 10% of the data, and an estimation sample containing the remaining observations. The bandwidths are computed using only observations in the training sample. In turn, the ATEs are obtained via the estimator given in equation (22) using only observations in the estimation sample. It is important to emphasize that splitting the sample is not required for the cross-validation method to be valid. The reason to proceed in this fashion is purely to ease the computational burden.
Existence of Heterogeneity in AT Es
Before presenting the estimation results we first display the cross-validated bandwidths. While bandwidths are usually just tuning parameters, in our setting we can interpret them in light of their actual economic content. As described in §5.2, the bandwidths take values between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates the limiting case in which the ATE for each treatment assignment is estimated separately and 1 concerns a scenario where there is complete pooling of observations with different treatment assignments. Results are given in Figure   10 . To do this, we start by abstracting from the effects of experimentation, focusing solely on the degenerate states of the world. To display the heterogeneity in estimated ATEs, we plot in Figure 11 the CDF of the conditional ATEs, that is, of all different τ 3 (ω −3 ) from equation (16). For comparison, we also plot the overall unconditional ATE from a linear regression of Y i3 on D i3 . We can see that the τ 3 (ω −3 )'s range from -0.16 to 0.16, with a standard deviation of 0.044. Given that the unconditional ATE equals 0.03, this is a large amount of heterogeneity. Interestingly, the unconditional ATE corresponds approximately to the 42nd percentile of the distribution, indicating an asymmetry.
Variation based on Identity of Competitor
Having established overall treatment effect heterogeneity, we now investigate how it varies depending on which competitor is advertising. To do so, we perform the following exercise. Fix a competitor, say, advertiser 1. We separate the ATEs into two groups: one in which 1 is always advertising and other in which 1 is never advertising. To be precise, let ω −3,−1 be the vector of the degenerate states of the world for all advertisers but 3 and 1.
We plot in red the CDF of all τ 3 (ω 1 = 1, ω −3,−1 )'s and in blue the CDF of all τ 3 (ω 1 = 0, ω −3,−1 )'s.
We do so separately for each of 3's competitors, displaying results in Figure 12 .
To see that the identity of the competing campaign matters, we focus on two specific cases. First, consider campaign 9. Looking at Figure 12 , we see the distribution of conditional of ATEs for advertiser 3 when 9 is advertising stochastically dominates that of when 9 is not advertising. This suggests that 9's presence can actually benefit advertiser 3 in the sense that it brings relatively more visitors to her product detail page, which could be due to spillover effects. In turn, consider the distributions associated with competitor 12. The opposite relationship is seen, with the distribution of conditional ATEs when 12 is not advertising stochastically dominating that of when 12 is advertising, suggesting a sort of "visit stealing" effect. These two specific examples illustrate how the identity of the competitor is relevant for campaign 3 as an advertiser's presence can either benefit or harm the effectiveness of her ad.
Variation based on Number of Competitors
Next, we explore how the total number of competitors that are advertising impacts the ATEs. To do so, we display a sequence of box-plots of the conditional ATEs as a function of the total number of competitors that are advertising. More precisely, for each ω −3 , define N 3 (ω −3 ) = ∑ k =3 ω k . Given that 3 has 15 competitors, it follows that the N 3 (ω −3 )'s are between 0 and 15. Hence, for each n ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 15} we create a box-plot for the τ 3 (ω −3 )'s such that N 3 (ω −3 ) = n. Results are given in Figure 13 . The thick lines represent the median ATEs, the boxes show the inter-quartile range, and the edges represent the minimum and maximum ATEs. The plot shows considerable variation. Naturally, when none or all competitors are advertising all these quantities coincide. It is interesting to note that the median ATE stabilizes after more than one competitor is always advertising.
Prospective AT Es Up to this point we have only looked at estimates associated with degenerate states of the world. Prospective ATEs were motivated earlier in the paper by the observation that in practice it might be more reasonable to expect that advertisers are not certain of a given competitor's participation. Consequently, estimates of conditional ATEs can be expressed as a function of the beliefs regarding whether a competitor is advertising or not. In §3.1.1, we showed the prospective ATE is a convex combination between the ATEs given that the competitor is always advertising or never advertising.
Formally, we consider all τ 3 (ω k )'s for k = 3 by averaging over the remaining competitor's actions.
We can then express the ATEs from equation (16) . For each k = 3 we plot τ 3 (p 3 ) as a function of p 3 (1) and display the results in Figure 14 . For the purposes of comparison we normalize the combinations by the maximum value the ATE can take, so that the largest value is always 1. The sign of the slope, therefore, indicates whether a competitor's ad aids (positive slope) or harms (negative slope) campaign 3, while the steepness indicates the extent to which a given competitor interferes with 3's campaign. Hence, Figure 14 also enables us to visualize heterogeneity in ATEs and the importance of the competitor's identity.
Similarly to Figure 12 , Figure 14 indicates sizable treatment effect interference.
So far we have only considered the impacts of competitors actions on the extensive margin: we have only looked at situations in which a competitor is either always advertising or never advertising. However, experimentation opens up an intensive margin angle since it yields states of the world where a competitor is advertising, but not always. Thus, we can display the ATE of interest as a function of both the probability a competitor advertises and the probability this competitor experiments given that he advertises.
To illustrate this, we focus on campaign 3's main competitor as defined above, advertiser 6. We consider the τ 3 (ω 6 )'s by averaging over the remaining competitor's actions. Furthermore, we fix Figure 15 : Advertiser C's ATE as a function of competitor F's probabilities of advertising and experimentation σ 6 = 0.7, the value in our experiment. We can then express τ 3 (p 3 ) as a function of p 3 (ω 6 = 1) and p * 3 (ω 6 = 1) and display this relationship in Figure 15 . Once again, the slopes show whether competitor 6 aids or harms 3's campaign. Notice that because of how ATEs are constructed the shape of this type of graph is constrained: whenever a competitor's ad is beneficial (detrimental) to the focal advertiser, that is, whenever the overall ATE is increasing (decreasing) in the probability that the competitor advertises, this overall ATE is decreasing (increasing) in the probability that the competitor experiments.
Finally, to show how uncertainty regarding experimentation can affect one's projected ad effectiveness we consider the following scenario. Advertiser 3 knows all her competitors advertise with probability one, so that p 3 (ω k = 0) = 0 for all k = 3. Should they experiment, C knows that they will allocate 70% of users to their treatment group, that is, σ k = 0.7 for all k = 3. The source of uncertainty is whether they will experiment or not. We consider two scenarios. The first scenario is that of aligned experimentation, in which there is a probability that all advertisers experiment at the same time or not, and allocate users to all treatment groups or all control groups. This could happen if all other advertisers actually represented different goods from the same brand, which decided to conduct an experiment to assess the effectiveness of advertising the brand by display- ally. This is likely the situation that takes place when the different advertisers represent competing brands for the same type of product.
We display the results in Figure 16 , showing how τ 3 (p 3 ) varies with p * 3 (·). While the projected ATE decreases only a bit under independent experimentation, the scenario with aligned experimentation displays a wide range of values, indicating that competitive experimentation is indeed a potential key factor in this environment.
Overall, these results serve to illustrate the validity of the framework in uncovering interactions across experimenters; and showcase how the estimates can be leveraged retrospectively and prospectively to understand how ad-effects for a firm vary as a function of the advertising and experimentation behavior of others on the platform.
Conclusions
A framework for sustaining parallel experimentation by firms on a digital advertising marketplace is presented. The framework allows the treatment effects for a focal firm's advertising policy to reflect the advertising and experimenting policies of the others. The framework can be implemented by a platform on behalf of its advertisers "as a service". The framework consists of a set of causal estimands, as well as an experimental design and estimation procedure that helps deliver these estimands. The causal estimands can be used retrospectively and prospectively. Retrospectively, given knowledge of the advertising and experimenting policies of all the firms at the time of her experiment, the focal firm can use the estimands to unpack the dependence of the measured ATE from the experiment on the actions of her competitors. This helps her interpret the effects she obtained from the experiment, and how they depend on the advertising and experimentation policies of others. Prospectively, given beliefs about the advertising and experimentation policies of others, the focal firm can use the estimands to trace out her ATEs in such prospective future states of the world. This helps decision making. The system is online on the advertising platform of JD.com. Results from a set of parallel experiments implemented there showcase the importance of accommodating a role for interactions across experimenters and demonstrates the viability of the framework.
